The differences between ECNs and Nasdaq market makers are used to formulate and test several hypotheses about the choice of trading venue and the importance of ECN trades in the price discovery process. Trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when spreads are narrow and when trading volume and stock-return volatility are high. Medium and large trades on ECNs have lower effective spreads than comparable market-maker trades, although this is not the case for small trades unless they occur on noninteger ticks. ECN trades have greater permanent price impacts than market-maker trades implying that informed trades are more likely to occur on ECNs. Overall, more private information is revealed through ECN trades than through market-maker trades even though more trades occur with market makers.
Introduction
Technological innovations that enable high-speed, low-cost electronic trading systems are dramatically changing the structure of financial markets. Exchanges and markets around the world are merging or forming alliances to improve liquidity and reduce costs in the face of increased competition from each other and from these computerized systems. Trading volume on Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) has grown rapidly over the past several years. In the United States, ECNs are involved in more than a third of Nasdaq trading volume and are attempting to increase their market share in NYSE-listed issues. ECNs' offer the promise of greater operational efficiency, lower trading costs, improved limit order exposure, trader anonymity, and faster executions.
ECNs differ from Nasdaq market makers in several important dimensions. The majority of small trades with market makers are preferenced or internalized. In exchange for a promise of best execution, market makers enter into long-term agreements with brokers who send them their customers' orders. Market makers also negotiate directly with customers to intermediate orders that are sometimes very large. ECNs, on the other hand, are open limit order books that facilitate customer-to-customer trades. ECNs compete with market makers for the nonpreferenced order flow by narrowing the quotes (sometimes using smaller tick sizes) and providing anonymous and immediate execution. ECNs also charge access fees for their use.
Using one month of data from June 2000 that identifies all ECN and market-maker trades for a stratified sample of 150 Nasdaq National Market (NNM) stocks, we address several questions related to the use of ECNs. First, we examine the market conditions under which ECN trades are most likely to occur. We then document the trading costs on these electronic trading systems and compare them with trading costs for market-maker trades. Finally, we investigate whether informed trades are more likely to occur with market makers or on ECNs, and study the role of ECN trading in the aggregate price discovery process. Together, these results provide new insights about investors' choices of trading venues.
ECN trades are smaller, on average, than market-maker trades and there is more ECN trading when spreads are narrow and when the market is more active in terms of higher trading volume and higher stock-return volatility. ECN trades are also more likely to occur on the side of the market where there is less depth. Not surprisingly, trades are more likely to occur on ECNs when ECNs offer better prices than market makers. ECN trades are more prevalent in stocks that have high trading volume, large market capitalization, and fewer market makers.
Small trades (less than 1,000 shares) that are executed on ECNs have slightly larger effective spreads than small trades executed through market makers. Some, but not all, of this difference can be explained by the market conditions at the time of the trade. The fact that some traders are willing to pay more to execute their small trades on ECNs suggests that the ECNs' nonprice features, such as speed and anonymity, attract these trades. Medium and large trades have significantly lower average effective spreads when they are executed on ECNs. There are relatively few medium and large trades on ECNs, however, because these trades execute on an ECN only when there is a "natural" counterparty offering sufficient depth on the ECN. Thus, the better prices on ECNs for medium and large trades are often unavailable.
ECN trades have larger price impacts than market-maker trades. Because prices tend to move in the direction of these trades, ECN trades of all sizes have significantly lower realized spreads than market-maker trades. The larger price impacts and smaller realized spreads suggest that ECN trades are more informed, on average, than market maker trades. To confirm this intuition, we decompose the stock-price variance into its trade-related and trade-unrelated components (Hasbrouck 1991a) , and show that ECN trading explains about two-thirds more of the stock-price variance than market-maker trades. To control for contemporaneous correlation between ECN and market-maker trades, we also estimate vector autoregressions (Hasbrouck 1991b ) to measure the permanent price impact of trades in different venues. When we conservatively assume that all of the contemporaneous correlation between ECN and marketmaker trades is attributable to market-maker trading, we find that the permanent price impact of an ECN trade is still 50 percent larger than the permanent price impact of a market-maker trade.
We also study ECNs' use of a smaller tick size. spreads, suggesting that they contain less information. These results suggest that patient traders with little information are willing and able to wait for the better prices to arrive on an ECN, while informed traders are more likely attracted to the ECNs' nonprice features such as anonymity and speed of execution.
Our results are related to the existing literature on multimarket trading. However, our results highlight important differences between ECNs and other trading venues, such as regional exchanges, that have skimmed order flow from primary markets. Generally, when a secondary market skims orders from the primary market, the secondary market skims the least informed and, consequently, most profitable orders. For example, Easley, Keifer, and O'Hara (1996) show that the Cincinnati Stock Exchange attracts mostly uninformed orders in NYSE stocks and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997) find this for the regional exchanges in general. In contrast, we find that trades on ECNs are more informed than trades with market makers. On Nasdaq, the market makers' preferencing and internalization agreements allow them to retain the lessinformed retail orders. Because ECNs match customer orders without participating in the trades, the more informed orders spill onto the ECNs.
ECNs are open limit order books that create a hybrid dealer/auction market on Nasdaq.
Thus, our results are related to the literature limit order books and automated markets. For example, Domowitz and Wang (1994) study the distributions of price and the dynamics of a limit order book for exogenous order submission strategies. Glosten (1994) examines the optimal prices schedule by competing liquidity suppliers in multiple markets and Parlour and Seppi (2001) study competition between a specialist/limit order market and a pure limit order market.
Examples of empirical analyses of limit order books include Coppejans, Domowitz, and Madhavan's (2001) investigation of the dynamics of liquidity provision in an electronic limit order futures market and Hollifield, Miller, and Sandås' (2001) estimation the asset valuation implied by liquidity suppliers' order placements and executions.
Several previous papers have examined the effect of ECN quotes. For example, Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz (1999) analyze the impact of Nasdaq's new order handling rules and show that ECN quotes play an important role in reducing trading costs. Simaan, Weaver, and Whitcomb (1999) show that ECN quotes are more likely to be on an odd tick than market-maker quotes. Huang (2001) finds that ECN quote updates are more informative than market-maker quote updates. Because these studies focus on quotes rather than on trades, however, they are unable to examine the role of ECN trading in the price discovery process or determine the venue in which informed traders choose to trade. This paper is the first to use comprehensive data to examine trading on ECNs.
2 By examining ECN trades in addition to ECN quotes, we are able to focus on the demanders of liquidity, rather than on the suppliers of liquidity. We also are able to calculate more direct measures of market performance such as effective and realized spreads, price improvement, and the permanent price impact of trades.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of ECNs and develops the hypotheses we test later in the paper. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 examines investors' choices of trading venues. Section 5 compares the cost of ECN and market-maker trades. Section 6 investigates the price discovery process and provides evidence that more informed trades occur on ECNs. Section 7 concludes.
An Overview of ECNs
The SEC defines ECNs as "electronic trading systems that automatically match buy and sell orders at specified prices." In a recent report, the SEC describes ECNs as having "become integral to the modern securities markets" (SEC, 2000) . Today, ECNs account for approximately 30 percent of total share volume and 40 percent of the dollar volume traded in Nasdaq securities.
ECNs account for approximately 3 percent of total share and dollar volume in listed securities. In contrast, in 1993 ECNs accounted for only 13 percent of share volume in Nasdaq securities and only 1.4 percent of listed share volume (SEC, 2000) .
Competing ECNs offer different fee structures and levels of service and cater to different investor clienteles. However, all ECNs provide the same basic transaction services. ECN subscribers submit limit orders that are posted on the system for other subscribers to view. The ECN then matches contra-side orders for execution. In most cases, the buyer and seller remain 2 In the cross section, Hasbrouck and Saar (2001) examine volatility's impact on limit orders on Island. Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2001) When ECNs first developed, they served primarily as private trading vehicles for institutional investors and broker-dealers. The prices posted on ECNs by these professional traders often were better than the prices posted on Nasdaq. Because the ECNs were not integrated into the Nasdaq market, many investors, particularly retail investors, traded at prices inferior to those displayed by market makers and other subscribers on ECNs. Essentially this created a twotiered market -the traditional public market, and the new ECN market with better prices and limited access.
In 1996, the SEC adopted new order-handling rules to integrate these markets. Before the adoption of the order-handling rules, market makers could post quotes in private ECNs that were better than the quotes they posted in the public market. This allowed market makers to segment their market, charging higher prices to retail customers and lower prices to more price-sensitive institutional investors. Under the new order-handling rules, market makers and specialists were required to reflect in their public quote any better prices that they placed on an ECN. The new order-handling rules had a large and immediate impact on the securities markets -trading costs fell dramatically, resulting in significant cost savings for investors (Barclay, Christie, Harris, Kandel, and Schultz, 1999) .
Today, almost any investor can trade through an ECN, including retail investors, institutional investors, market makers, and broker-dealers. The recent proliferation of new electronic markets led the SEC to consider how to incorporate these trading venues into the national market system. In December 1998, the SEC adopted Regulation ATS to establish a regulatory framework for alternative trading systems to more fully integrate them into the national market system. The goals of Regulation ATS were to provide investors with access to the best prices, provide a complete audit trail and surveillance on alternative trading systems, and reduce the potential for market disruption due to system outages.
Once ECNs were fully integrated into the Nasdaq market, investors had to decide if and when they should be utilized. ECNs offer several potential benefits to investors. First, ECNs typically offer an advantage in the speed of execution. Traditional orders are sent first to a broker, either electronically or over the phone, who determines the market where they will be sent for execution. There are no SEC regulations concerning the time required to complete this task. Although trade executions are usually seamless and quick, they do take time. In fast-moving markets, investors using traditional brokers will not always receive the price they saw on their computer screen or the price their broker quoted over the phone. By the time their orders reach the market, the price of the stock could be slightly -or very -different. The potential benefits of trading on an ECN must be weighed against the costs. ECNs charge fees for their services that are paid directly by subscribers and indirectly by nonsubscribers.
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In addition, market makers sometimes execute orders at prices better than the 3 Some market makers, such as Knight Securities, offer automated execution that is as fast as ECNs and the price is guaranteed, whereas the limit order on the ECN may disappear before the trade can be executed. 4 Effective June 3, 1997, Nasdaq moved to a tick of one-sixteenth for stocks with a bid price of $10 or more, implying that ECN quotes are rounded to the nearest sixteenth of a dollar. Decimalization on Nasdaq will reduce rounding, but will not eliminate it because some ECNs already utilize a tick of less than one cent. 5 For subscribers these fees include a fixed component, the cost of purchasing the ECN terminal and line feed, and a per-share fee for execution. For non-subscribers an access fee of 1/4 to 2 cents per share is charged for orders that NBBO. This practice, known as price improvement, is one dimension on which market makers compete with each other.
6
In addition, market makers sometimes execute orders larger than the inside quoted depth, a practice referred to as size enhancement. Other individual investors may or may not be aware of the market to which their broker routes their orders. Market makers can also route customer orders to an ECN. Market orders execute on an ECN when the ECN is posting the best bid or offer and the market maker does not want to match that price. Limit orders submitted to a market maker can be routed to an ECN in accordance with the new order-handling rules.
Hypotheses
The important differences between ECNs and Nasdaq market makers suggest a number of hypotheses about which investors are likely to trade on ECNs, when ECN trades are likely to occur, the relative costs of ECN and market-maker trades, and the relative contributions to price discovery from these trading venues. We summarize these hypotheses below.
execute against a standing ECN order. During our sample period, this fee was paid by the intermediary routing the order to the ECN and was not charged directly to investors. 6 Because not all ECN orders are displayed in the NBBO, ECN trades sometimes occur at prices better than the NBBO. However, because ECNs simply match orders to buy with orders to sell, generally there is no opportunity for price improvement beyond the unrounded or undisplayed quote on an ECN.
• Hypothesis 1: ECN trades are more informed than market-maker trades and consequently have larger permanent price impacts and contribute more to the overall price-discovery process. ECN trades are also more likely to occur when there is more information in the market as evidenced by high trading volume and high stock-return volatility.
Nasdaq market makers have several mechanisms that allow them to capture a disproportionate share of the uninformed order flow. For example, preferencing and internalization agreements allow market makers to identify and retain less-informed retail orders.
In addition, market-maker trades with institutions generally are not anonymous. Repeated negotiations between institutional investors and market makers discourage informed institutional trades with market makers. Finally, informed traders will naturally gravitate to ECNs because they will value the ECNs' speed of execution and pre-and post-trade anonymity. Because the market makers are able to capture a significant fraction of the less-informed orders, the residual trading on ECNs will be more informed and the ECN trades will have larger average price impacts and will contribute more to the overall price-discovery process.
Informed orders are likely to be more sensitive to changes in market conditions than uninformed orders. In particular, informed traders are expected to be most active when new information hits the market and when information asymmetry is high. If a disproportionate share of informed trades occur on ECNs, then ECN trades will be more likely when there is more information in the market as evidenced by high trading volume and high stock-return volatility.
• Hypothesis 2: ECN trades are smaller, on average, than market-maker trades and are more likely to occur when the quoted inside spread is narrow and when the ECN quote is on the inside.
Market-maker quotes must reflect the costs of intermediation. In addition, preferencing and internalization agreements reduce market makers incentives to aggressively narrow their quotes. ECNs quotes, on the other hand, reflect limit orders from investors who are willing to trade patiently in exchange for lower trading costs. Because the trading costs of these investors are sunk, they can compete effectively with market makers by narrowing the spread. Unlike market makers, however, these patient traders are not required to make a continuous market.
Therefore, good quotes on ECNs are not always available. If ECNs attract orders by narrowing the spread, then ECN trades will be more likely to occur when the spread is narrow and when ECNs are offering better prices than market makers.
Models of trading with asymmetric information predict that adverse selection costs borne by liquidity providers increase with the depth of the quote. These large adverse selection costs constrain the size of limit orders on ECNs. Market makers are better able to manage these adverse selection costs because their large trades are negotiated with repeat customers. Therefore, we expect that ECN trades will be smaller, on average, than market-maker trades and there will be relatively few large ECN trades.
• Hypothesis 3: ECN trades have smaller realized spreads than market-maker trades.
Large ECN trades also have smaller effective spreads than large market-maker trades.
However, effective spreads for small ECN trades may be larger or smaller than effective spreads for small market-maker trades.
As noted above, because ECNs facilitate customer-to-customer trades, we expect that ECNs will often offer better prices than market makers. In addition, ECNs charge access fees, which directly affect the cost of the trade, but are not reflected in the transaction price. Both of these effects suggest that ECN trades should execute at lower effective spreads than marketmaker trades. However, informed traders may also be attracted to ECNs because of their nonprice features, such as anonymity and speed of execution. If these nonprice features are valued by informed traders, they might be willing to pay a higher effective spread to trade on an ECN.
These competing factors make it unclear whether the average effective spread for ECN trades will be larger or smaller than the average effective spread for market-maker trades.
However, when comparing trading costs across these two venues, two trends should emerge.
First, because market-making costs are increasing in trade size, large ECN trades should be cheaper than large market-maker trades. Second, because ECN trades are more informed, post-trade prices should move in the direction of the trade, reducing the ex post trading costs of ECN trades as measured, for example, by the realized spread.
• . The small tick size on ECNs gave limit order providers a lower-cost opportunity to jump to the head of the limit order book by shaving the quote by a small price increment. Trades on noninteger ticks generally have smaller effective spreads because they are offering prices that market makers are unable to match. A patient trader might be willing to wait for these good prices to arrive on an ECN with the hope of lowering his trading costs. However, because the potential price improvement is small, an informed trader is less likely to wait. Therefore, we expect ECN trades on noninteger ticks to have lower average effective spreads and be less informed than ECN trades on integer ticks.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our data contains all of the trades and quotes for 150 Nasdaq National Market ( We also classify trades by trade size and construct dummy variables, size1, size2, and size3, that are set equal to one for trades that are small (1,000 shares or less), medium (1,001 to 9,999 shares), or large (10,000 shares or more), respectively. The dummy variables ecn1, ecn2, and ecn3 are equal to the trade-size dummies interacted with the ECN dummy. To examine the importance of smaller tick sizes used by ECNs, we also construct dummy variables, ecnfrac1, ecnfrac2, and ecnfrac3, that are set equal to one for small, medium and large trades, respectively, that occur on ECNs with prices that are not an even multiple of 1/16.
Trades are matched with quotes using execution times and the following algorithm that has been found to perform well for the Nasdaq market. For SelectNet, SOES, and ACES trades, we match the trade with the inside quote one second or more before the trade execution time.
Because SelectNet, SOES, and ACES are electronic trading systems run by Nasdaq, the execution times are very reliable. For other trades, we match the trade with the inside quote three seconds or more before the trade report time.
Using the Lee and Ready (1991) The percentage of small trades occurring on an ECN is 34 percent for the medium-volume stocks and 26 percent for the low-volume stocks. Relatively few medium and large trades occur on ECNs in the medium-and low-volume categories.
[ Insert Table 2 Here ] 8 On a daily basis, we identify market makers in each security from the individual market participant quote data. Any firm that has at least one valid quote during the day is classified as a market maker in that security. 9 The positive association between normal trading volume and the fraction of volume on an ECN is evidence of a liquidity externality (Mendelson, 1982 , and others). Table 2 shows that ECNs are more likely to be used for small trades in high-volume stocks. However, the likelihood of an ECN trade is also affected by the market conditions at the time of the trade. To investigate the impact of market conditions on the likelihood of an ECN trade, we estimate a probit regression for the choice of trading venue.
The Choice of Trading on ECNs or with Market Makers
[Insert Table 3 The second group of variables is related to the level of market activity and describes the information environment at the time of the trade. The market activity variables that we include are the total dollar trading volume in the stock during the previous 15 minutes (dvol15), the stock-return volatility during the previous 15 minutes (σ15 = the absolute value of the stock return over the previous 15 minutes), and the stock-price momentum (momentum15 = buy/sell indicator * signed stock return over the previous 15 minutes). Finally, in addition to the variables listed above, we include the size of the trade (svol = the number of shares traded), firm fixed effects, and dummy variables for each half-hour time period during the trading day.
10 10 A number of other variables were also tested: the number of trades, dollar trading volume, stock-return volatility and stock-price momentum during the previous 30 minutes, 60 minutes and the previous trading day; the depth measured one, two or three ticks from each stock's time-weighted quoted spread; the spreads necessary to generate Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients from the probit regression with the corresponding linear probability slopes and Chi-Square statistics. The negative coefficient on the inside quoted half-spread in all three volume categories suggests that ECNs attract volume by offering better prices and narrowing the quotes. When quotes are narrow, it is more likely that an ECN quote is on the inside, making an ECN trade more likely. This intuition is confirmed when we replace the inside quoted half-spread with the market-maker inside quoted half-spread and the quoted spread difference. In this specification, we find that in all volume categories ECNs attract more orders when they are offering better prices than market makers, as indicated by a positive coefficient on the quoted spread difference (although the coefficients in the medium and lowvolume categories are extremely small and round to zero at two decimal places). The coefficient on the market-maker quoted spread changes sign from negative in the high-volume category to positive in the medium-and low-volume categories. We believe that this difference reflects the differing role of ECNs in high and low-volume stocks. In the medium and low-volume categories, a wide market-maker spread increases the incentives for investors to place limit orders on an ECN, which in turn increases the probability of an ECN trade. In the high-volume stocks, however, ECN quotes are usually on the inside and exhibit little time-series variation (Huang, 2001) . Thus, the market-maker quoted spread and the difference between the marketmaker and ECN quoted spread are highly collinear, which complicates the interpretation of the coefficients.
Liquidity Variables
As with the market-maker quoted spread variable, the coefficient on the quoted depth changes sign from negative for the high-volume stocks to positive for the medium-and lowvolume stocks. Again, because ECNs are usually at the inside for high-volume stocks, greater quoted depth at the inside usually will be associated with more aggressive market-maker quotes, which will reduce the likelihood of an ECN trade. In the lower-volume stocks, ECNs are less likely to be at the inside and there are fewer market makers per stock. In this situation, more quoted depth on the inside generally indicates more liquidity supplied by the ECNs, which several different levels of quoted depth; and the time-weighted spread and depth during the previous 5, 15, or 30 minutes. These variables add little to the explanatory power of the regression and do not affect the coefficients of interest.
increases the likelihood of an ECN trade. For all volume categories, more depth offered on the side of the trade (depth imbalance) is associated with a lower probability that the trade will occur on an ECN.
Market Activity Variables
The coefficients on the market-activity variables indicate that ECN trading is more likely when there is higher trading volume and when there is new information as measured by the stock-return volatility. ECN trading is not significantly related to stock-price momentum, however, suggesting that short-term momentum traders are not concentrated in a single trading venue.
Consistent with the summary statistics in Table 2 As an alternative to the specification using firm fixed effects, we also estimated the probit regressions including firm characteristics (not reported). These regressions indicate that ECN trades are more prevalent in stocks that have high trading volume, large market capitalization, and fewer market makers. Whether we include firm fixed effects or firm characteristics, the coefficients on the remaining variables are largely unaffected.
Trading Costs: Market Makers versus ECNs
Investors' choices of whether to send their orders to a market maker or to an ECN will depend on the total expected trading costs, including the implicit, explicit, and opportunity costs. The effective half-spreads for high-volume Nasdaq stocks are quite small, averaging between 7 and 16 basis points depending on trade size and trading venue.
Effective Spreads
Consequently, there is not much room for large absolute differences in effective spreads between ECN and market-maker trades for these stocks. Nevertheless, small trades on ECNs have slightly larger effective spreads than small trades with market makers, indicating that the nonprice features of ECNs may attract some investors. For medium and large-size trades in the highvolume category, however, the market-maker effective spreads are more than 50 percent larger than the ECN effective spreads.
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[ Insert Table 4 Here ]
Spreads are wider in the medium-and low-volume categories than in the high-volume category, and the absolute differences between ECN and market-maker effective spreads generally are also larger. ECN trades have lower effective spreads than market-maker trades for all trade sizes in the medium-volume category. In the low-volume category, market-maker trades have lower effective spreads for small and medium-size trades and ECN trades have lower effective spreads for large trades. It is interesting to note that for the medium-and low-volume 11 Table 4 also reports realized spreads -the appropriately signed transaction prices minus the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade -and price impacts -the appropriately signed change in the quote midpoint at the time of the trade to five minutes after the trade. However, a detailed discussion of the realized spreads and price impacts is delayed until Sections 5.3 and 6.1. 12 Unlike ECNs, market makers typically add a 3 to 6 cents per share mark-up, in lieu of commissions, on institutional trades. This may account for some of the cost differences we find for large trades.
categories, effective spreads increase with trade size for market-maker trades, but decline with trade size for ECN trades. The probit regressions in Table 3 demonstrate that market conditions at the time of the trade have a significant impact on the likelihood that a trade is executed by a market maker or on an ECN. These market conditions are also likely to affect the effective spreads. Therefore, in Table 5 , we control for the effect of these market conditions by regressing the percentage effective half-spread for each trade on trade-size dummies, an ECN dummy variable interacted with the trade-size dummies, and control variables describing the market conditions at the time of the trade.
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As in the probit regressions, the control variables include liquidity variables (quoted inside spread, quoted depth at the inside, and quoted depth imbalance) and market activity variables (dollar trading volume, stock-return volatility, and stock-price momentum during the 15 minutes prior to the trade).
14 To control for time period and stock characteristics, these regressions also include firm fixed effects and dummy variables for each half-hour during the trading day.
The effective-spread regressions are reported separately for each volume category. The variables of interest in these regressions are the trade-size dummies interacted with the ECN dummy (ecn1, ecn2, and ecn3). The coefficients on these variables indicate the average difference in percentage effective half-spreads (measured in basis points) between ECN and 13 Regressions run separately by trade size or using the probit results from Section 4 in the Heckman (1979) twostage procedure to control for selectivity provide similar results. 14 Adding the quoted spread as a control variable in the effective-spread regressions measures the quality of execution in relation to the quoted spread, which is commonly called price improvement. If we exclude the quoted spread from these regressions, the coefficients on the ECN dummy variables in the high and medium-volume categories are largely unaffected. However, for the low-volume category, excluding the quoted spread from the regression reduces the relative cost of ECN trades.
market-maker trades after controlling for trade size and other variables that have been shown to affect trading costs.
[ Insert Table 5 Here ]
The results in Table 5 generally are consistent with the univariate comparisons in Table 4 .
However, controlling for market conditions at the time of the trade generally reduces the measured cost of ECN trades in relation to market-maker trades. The fact that ECN trades are more likely to occur when stock-return volatility is high, and when there is less depth on the side of the trade, is consistent with the notion that ECN trades occur when trading is more difficult or more costly. Therefore, controlling for these market conditions improves the relative performance of the ECN trades.
As noted above, small trades in high-volume stocks are slightly more expensive on ECNs than when they are executed by market makers. The coefficient on the dummy variable ecn1 is only 0.28 basis points, however, which is small by any metric. Small ECN trades have lower effective spreads for medium-volume stocks and higher effective spreads for low-volume stocks, although these differences are also small. Although medium and large trades get better prices when they are executed on an ECN, it is clear that these better prices on ECNs are often unavailable. Market makers generally offer more depth than ECNs. For high-volume stocks, for example, Table 2 shows that ECNs capture 51 percent of the volume in small trades, but only 21 percent of the volume in medium trades, and only two percent of the volume from large trades. When investors want medium or large trades, they generally go to a market maker. Medium and large trades go to an ECN only when there is a natural counterparty supplying liquidity on the ECN.
The Effect of Noninteger Ticks
During our sample period, ECNs used price increments that were smaller than the minimum tick size of 1/16 th on the Nasdaq. In our sample, almost 19 percent of the small ECN trades occurred on noninteger ticks, while only three percent of small market-market trades occurred on noninteger ticks. The percentage of medium-size trades on noninteger ticks is more similar across the trading venues: 9 percent for market-maker trades and 12 percent for ECN trades. Both ECNs and market makers execute about 12 percent of their large trades on noninteger ticks. To study the effect of the ECNs' smaller tick size, we create three dummy variables, ecnfrac1, ecnfrac2, and ecnfrac3, that are set equal to one for small, medium and large trades, respectively, that occur on ECNs with prices that are not an even multiple of 1/16.
The ECN trades on noninteger ticks have significantly lower effective spreads than ECN trades on integer ticks. For high-volume stocks, the effective spread for small, medium and large trades on noninteger ticks is approximately 3, 5 and 8 basis points lower than ECN trades on integer ticks. Although small in absolute value, this represents a savings of 30 to 40 percent on the spread-related cost of the trade. For the medium-and low-volume stocks, the average effective spread for ECN trades on noninteger ticks is between 6 and 22 basis points lower than the effective spread for ECN trades on integer ticks.
Realized Spreads
Realized spreads provide an ex post measure of trading cost to the demander of liquidity and an ex post measure of profitability for the provider of liquidity. The difference between an ex ante measure of cost (such as the effective spread) and an ex post measure of cost (the realized spread) is the price impact of the trade.
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If trades contain information, then prices will move in 15 The effective spread is equal to the difference between the transaction price and the quote midpoint at the time of the trade. The realized spread is equal to the difference between the signed transaction price and the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade. Therefore, the difference between the effective and realized spread is the signed the direction of the trade (up following purchases and down following sales), reducing the ex post trading costs. If ECN trades are more informed than market-maker trades, then ECN trades should have lower realized spreads than market-maker trades. Table 4 shows that realized spreads are lower for ECN trades than for market-maker trades in all volume categories and for all trade sizes. The difference between the ECN and market-maker realized spreads are larger for larger trades and for lower-volume stocks. To control for trade size and other variables that have been shown to affect trading costs, Table 6 reports regressions of the percentage realized half-spread for each trade on trade-size dummies, an ECN dummy variable interacted with the trade-size dummies, and control variables describing the market conditions at the time of the trade. As in the previous regressions, the control variables include liquidity variables (quoted inside spread, quoted depth at the inside, and quoted depth imbalance) and market activity variables (dollar trading volume, stock-return volatility, and stock-price momentum during the 15 minutes prior to the trade). To control for time period and stock characteristics, these regressions also include firm fixed effects and dummy variables for each half-hour during the trading day. Regressions are reported separately for each volume category. The variables of interest in these regressions are the ECN dummy interacted with the trade-size dummies (ecn1, ecn2, and ecn3). The coefficients on these variables indicate the average difference in percentage realized half-spreads between ECN and market-maker trades.
[ Insert Table 6 Here ]
Consistent with the results in Table 4 , after controlling for the market conditions at the time of the trade, realized spreads are significantly lower for ECN trades than for market-maker trades in all volume categories and for all trade sizes. In addition, the coefficients on the ECN dummy variables are 2 to 5 times larger in Table 6 than the corresponding coefficients in the effective spread regressions in Table 5 .
Tables 5 shows that the use of smaller minimum price increments on ECNs' results in lower ex ante trading costs. By quoting on fractional ticks, ECNs can attract market (or marketable-limit) orders, particularly from the most price sensitive traders. However, if difference between the quote midpoint at the time of the trade and the quote midpoint five minutes after the trade, which is often referred to as the price impact.
uninformed traders are more patient and, consequently, more likely to wait for the better prices offered on ECNs, then ECN trades on noninteger ticks would be less informed, on average, than ECN trades on integer ticks. The large positive coefficients on ecnfrac1, ecnfrac2, and ecnfrac3
in Table 6 , as opposed to the negative coefficients on the same variables in Table 5 , confirm that ECN trades on fractional ticks are less informed than other ECN trades.
As discussed above, realized spreads provide a measure of the ex post cost or profitability of a trade. Thus, realized spreads combine two important characteristics of the trade, the effective spread and the price impact of the trade. Because we are interested specifically in the relative price impact of ECN and market-maker trades, it is useful to separate these two effects.
Information and Price Discovery from ECN and Market-Maker trades
The simplest measure of the amount of information contained in a trade is the price impact, or the signed difference between the bid-ask midpoint at the time of the trade and the bid-ask midpoint a short time after the trade. We begin our analysis of the informativeness of ECN and market-maker trades by examining this simple measure. We then investigate several more sophisticated techniques that control for temporary price effects and both serial and cross correlation in the number of trades.
Price Impact
The price impacts of ECN and market-maker trades are reported in Table 4 . Table 4 shows that ECN trades have much larger price impacts than market-maker trades. Generally, when a secondary market skims orders from a primary market, there is a concern that the secondary market will skim the most profitable, i.e., least informed, orders. This cream skimming will increase the adverse selection in the primary market, resulting in higher trading costs and lower depth in the primary market. There is some evidence, for example, that the regional exchanges skim less-informed order flow from the NYSE (Easley, Keifer, and O'Hara, 1996 and Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997) . On Nasdaq, the opposite seems to occur. Nasdaq market makers apparently have been able to retain the most profitable orders while the more informed and consequently less profitable orders are executed on the secondary (ECN) market. Thus, informed traders are unlikely to reveal themselves by placing a large order with a market maker because market makers will use this information in future negotiations. Instead, informed traders will break up their large orders in an attempt to camouflage their trades with the uninformed order flow (Barclay and Warner, 1993) . Because trading on an ECN is anonymous, however, informed traders can take out whatever depth is available on the ECN without concern about future retribution. [ Insert Table 7 Here ]
The results in Table 7 confirm the price impact statistics observed in Table 4 . After controlling for market conditions at the time of the trade, ECN trades are significantly more informative than market-maker trades for every trade size in every volume category. In addition, the price impact of market maker trades decreases with trade size (as indicated by the negative coefficients for the variables size2 and size3) while the price impact of ECN trades increases in trade size (as indicated by the sum of ecn2 and size2 or ecn3 and size3).
The measured price impact of a trade will be biased if trades are serially correlated. In our data, the trade direction is persistent -buys are more likely to follow buys and sells are more likely to follow sells -and the persistence is greater for ECN trades than for market-maker trades.
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But if a series of buys, for example, occurs in rapid succession, then each buy order will be credited with the aggregate price impact of the entire series, and the price impact of any individual trade will be overstated. Because the persistence of the trade direction is greater for ECN trades than for market-maker trades, the potential bias in the measured price impact is likely to be greater for ECN trades than for market maker trades.
One way to control for the serial correlation in trades is to "thin" the data. We accomplish this by only using the last trade each 15-second interval. By thinning the data in this way, we eliminate series of buys or sells in rapid succession and greatly reduce the serial correlation in the buy/sell indicator. The last three columns of Table 7 reestimate the price-impact regressions with this thinned sample. As expected, the coefficients on the ECN dummy variables are somewhat smaller, but they remain large and statistically significant.
Price Discovery from Market Makers and ECNs: Variance Decomposition
To determine both the relative and absolute amounts of price discovery from trades with market makers and trades on ECNs, we use the variance decomposition technique from Hasbrouck (1991a) . We decompose the variance of the efficient stock price into a component that is correlated with prior trades and a component that is uncorrelated with prior trades. The component of the stock-price variance that is correlated with prior trading is interpreted as the revelation of private information through trading. This decomposition is performed separately for market-maker trades and for ECN trades. Thus, in addition to controlling for serial correlation in the signed trades, the variance decomposition provides a measure of the total contribution to price discovery from ECN trades.
Following Hasbrouck, the time scale ( t ) is defined as the transaction sequence. We represent a trade at time t by the variable x t = +1 for a buy order and x t = −1 for a sell order. The percentage change (log return) in the quote midpoint subsequent to that trade (but prior to the next trade at t + 1) is denoted r t . We then estimate the following VAR of trades and quote changes: The trading process is assumed to restart at the beginning of each day, at which time all lagged values of x t and r t are set to zero. Because the average number of trades per unit time is sensitive to normal trading volume, we use p=100 lags for high-volume stocks, 20 lags for medium-volume stocks, and 10-lags for low-volume stocks.
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Once estimated, the VAR representation can be inverted to generate the following vector , into the price changes caused by the arrival of public information and price changes caused by the arrival of private information through trades: 18 We also estimate, but do not present, a model in which x t is a vector containing signed trade, signed trade volume, and signed trade volume squared (as in Hasbrouck, 1991a,b) . Adding signed trade volume and signed trade volume squared provides little additional explanatory power, primarily because large trades on Nasdaq do not appear to contain more information than small trades (see the related discussion of the price impact by trade size). We also estimate the system using varying numbers of lagged trades and quote changes. Our results are not sensitive to the choice of the number of lags. , represents the fraction of the total price discovery that is attributed to private information revealed though trades.
This variance decomposition is performed separately for market-maker and ECN trades by using only the market-maker or ECN trades to estimate the VAR. Because the variance of the efficient price (σ v 2 ) is the same in both venues, comparing the ratio of private information to total
) for ECN and market-maker trades indicates which trading venue contributes more to price discovery. This approach is similar to the information share employed by Hasbrouck (1995) for the NYSE and regional exchanges and by Huang (2001) for ECNs and several categories of market makers. However, the information share estimates in these papers are based solely on quotes and do not directly investigate where informed traders trade.
[ Insert Table 8 Here ]
The results of the variance decompositions described above are reported in Table 8 . For the high-volume stocks, ECN trades explain more than twice as much of the efficient price variance than market-maker trades (28% for ECN trades and 12% for market-maker trades), even though less than half of all trades in this volume category are executed on ECNs. For the medium and low-volume stocks, ECN trades explain about 60% more of the efficient price variance than market-maker trades, even though less than one-third of all trades in these volume categories are executed on ECNs. The difference in means between σ x 2 /σ v 2 for ECN and market-maker trades is significant at the .01 level for all three volume categories with t-statistics of 16, eight, and seven for the high-, medium-, and low-volume categories, respectively.
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For each stock and trading venue, the standard deviation of σ x 2 /σ v 2 is calculated using 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations with random draws from the estimated VAR coefficients. We use these standard deviations to determine the number of firms for which the amount of private information due to ECN trading is greater than the amount due to market-market trading at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. For high-volume stocks, ECN trades explain more of the efficient price variance for 49 of the 50 stocks and the difference is significant at the .01 level for 48 stocks. For medium and low-volume stocks, ECN trades explain more of the efficient price variance for 44 and 40 of the 50 stocks, respectively, and the difference is significant at the .01 level for 16 and 11.
The variance decomposition technique controls for serial correlation in trades through the inclusion of lagged trades in the VAR. However, this technique does not control for contemporaneous correlation between ECN and market-maker trades. In our data, the contemporaneous correlation between ECN and market-maker trades is high enough to warrant further exploration. 
The Impulse Response Function
Several previous papers examine the price discovery process for stocks trading in multiple venues. These papers typically examine quote changes in the different venues and attempt to determine which market "moves first." These papers must also deal with the issue of contemporaneous correlation between trades in the different venues. Hasbrouck (1995) and Because the clock is based on calendar time rather than transaction time, the VAR uses the same number of lags, 10, for all volume categories.
As in the previous section, the VAR is inverted to get the vector moving average (VMA) representation. However, we now focus on the impulse response functions that measure the permanent price impacts from shocks to the trade equations. The estimated bounds for the permanent price impacts of ECN and market-maker trades are reported in Table 9 . As discussed in Hasbrouck (1991a,b) this method is also robust to price discreteness, lagged adjustment to information, and lagged adjustment to trades. Table 9 shows that the permanent price impact of ECN trades is at least 50 percent larger than the permanent price impact of market-maker trades. For high-volume stocks, the lower bound for the ECN price impact is almost 50 percent larger than the upper bound for the marketmaker price impact. The relative magnitudes of the ECN lower bound and the market-maker upper bound are similar in the medium-and low-volume categories. The difference between the lower bound of the ECN permanent price impact and the upper bound of the market-maker permanent price impact is significant at the .01 level for all three volume categories, with tstatistics of eight, seven, and six, respectively.
[ Insert Table 9 Here ] As in the previous section, we calculate the standard deviation of the permanent price impacts from 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations with random draws from the estimated VAR coefficients. We use these standard deviations to determine the number of firms for which the lower bound for the ECN price impact is greater than the upper bound for the market-maker price impact at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. For high-volume stocks, the lower bound of the ECN price impact is greater than the upper bound for the market-maker price impact for 46 of the 50 stocks, and the difference is statistically significant at the .01 level for 40 stocks. For medium and low-volume stocks, the lower bound of the ECN price impact is greater than the upper bound of the market-maker price impact 42 of the 50 stocks, and the difference is statistically significant at the .01 level for 24 and 22 stocks, respectively.
Conclusion
This paper provides the first systematic study of trading on the most prolific alternative trading systems, ECNs. To provide new insights about why some traders use ECNs, we study how the differences between ECNs and Nasdaq market makers affect the choice of trading venue and the cost of ECN and market-maker trades. We also investigate whether informed trades are more likely to occur with market makers or on ECNs, and study the importance of ECN trades for the aggregate price discovery process.
We show that ECNs attract more informed orders and that these trades occur during periods of high volume and stock-return volatility. ECNs' smaller tick size also attracts less informed orders seeking (and receiving) lower ex ante execution costs. The ECNs' customer-tocustomer interactions generate significantly lower trading costs for large trades when there is a natural counterparty offering significant liquidity on an ECN. Because this much depth is seldom available on an ECN, however, traders seeking to trade large quantities typically require the services of an intermediary.
There is widespread concern about the detrimental effects of market fragmentation resulting from the proliferation of alternative trading venues (Mendelson, 1987 , Grossman, 1992 , Madhavan, 1995 , Mendelson and Hendershott, 2001 , and others). A major concern about multimarket trading is that a secondary market will skim the most profitable (i.e., least informed)
orders. This cream skimming would increase the adverse selection in the primary market and result in higher trading costs and lower depth in the primary market. There is some evidence, for example, that the regional exchanges skim less-informed order flow from the NYSE (Easley, Keifer, and O'Hara, 1996, and Bessembinder and Kaufman, 1997) . On Nasdaq, the opposite seems to occur. Nasdaq market makers apparently have been able to retain the most profitable orders while the more informed and consequently less profitable orders are executed on the secondary (ECN) market. Decomposing the stock-price variance into its trade-related and tradeunrelated components, we show that ECN trading explains from 60 to 100 percent more of the efficient stock-price variance than market-maker trading. We find that the lower bound for the permanent price impact of ECN trades is about 50 percent larger than the upper bound for the permanent price impact of market-maker trades. These results show that ECNs have the unusual feature of attracting the more informed orders, something not found in any theoretical model of multimarket trading. In addition, these results show that ECN trading is an important component of the overall price discovery process.
Several widely used practices of Nasdaq trading, such as preferencing, internalization and payment for order flow have been widely criticized in the academic literature. The fact that a majority of the aggregate price discovery occurs on ECNs provides a potential explanation for the high quality and efficiency of the Nasdaq stock prices despite these practices. Because ECNs facilitate trades that are more difficult in some dimensions, e.g., more informed trades in active and volatile markets, while market makers facilitate trades that are more difficult in other dimensions, e.g., larger trades, ECNs provide an important complement, but not a complete substitute, for the traditional trading mechanism with market makers. Thus, our results contribute to an integrated picture of quoting, trading, and price discovery in the hybrid Nasdaq marketplace. 
